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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 This case concerns Appellant Peter Brownstein’s claim 
under the Copyright Act seeking a declaratory judgment of 
joint authorship of an ethnic identification system that he 
created with Appellee Tina Lindsay, the Lindsay Cultural 
Identification Determinate (“LCID”).  Lindsay purports to 
have conveyed the copyrights to the LCID to Appellee Ethnic 
Technologies (“E-Tech”).  The contested work is a computer 
program that implements rules for identifying the ethnicity of 
proper names for the purposes of direct marketing.  In 
addition to a declaration of his joint authorship, Brownstein 
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sought an accounting of the profits from the ethnic 
identification system.  In response, Appellees counterclaimed 
to cancel the copyright registrations that Brownstein had 
received for the system’s computer code, which was his 
contribution to the work.   
 After the District Court denied summary judgment, the 
case went to trial.  At the end of Brownstein’s case, the 
District Court granted Appellees judgment as a matter of law 
under Rule 50(a) on Brownstein’s joint authorship claim.  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a).  The District Court found that 
Brownstein’s claim was time-barred and that he could not 
succeed on the merits of his claim based on the evidence 
adduced at trial.  The District Court severed Appellees’ 
counterclaim and later issued an opinion granting summary 
judgment to Appellees on their counterclaim.   
 This appeal presents two issues of first impression for 
our Circuit.  The first is when a joint authorship claim under 
the Copyright Act arises and accrues and the second is 
whether courts have the authority to cancel copyright 
registrations.  For the following reasons, we hold that an 
authorship claim arises and accrues when a plaintiff’s 
authorship has been “expressly repudiated”.  We also hold 
that courts have no authority to cancel copyright registrations.  
We will reverse both the District Court’s grant of judgment as 
a matter of law to Appellees and its grant of summary 
judgment to Appellees on their counterclaim.  Also, we will 
remand the case for a new trial. 
I. BACKGROUND 




1. The Beginning 
 Brownstein and Lindsay worked together at Future 
Prospective Clients, Inc. (“FPCI”), a direct mailing list 
company, when they began developing the ethnic 
identification system.  FPCI later assumed a new corporate 
identity, List Services Direct, Inc. (“LSDI”).1  Beginning 
around December 1993, Lindsay began devising the idea and 
developing the rules for categorizing names by ethnicity (e.g., 
by looking at first names, last names, suffixes, prefixes, and 
geographic location).  These rules became known as the 
Ethnic Determinate System (“EDS”) — they could be written 
out in text, just as one might write out a recipe or driving 
directions.  The system would use this set of rules to run a 
computer program that would predict the ethnicity of a 
random list of names from a direct mailing database.   
 In January 1994, Lindsay enlisted Brownstein to turn 
her rules into computer code.  This required Brownstein to 
code a number of computer programs that did everything 
from rewriting a list of names into the proper data format for 
processing to turning Lindsay’s rules into computer code.  
These programs became known as the ETHN programs.
2
  
Over the years, Brownstein improved and updated the ETHN 
programs, with each new generation of programs being a 
                                                 
1
 For our purposes, the two are interchangeable. 
2
 The programs are called the ETHN programs because they 
were named ETHN04, ETHN05, etc.  The computer code 
they contained were scripts of written commands that would 
be read by a computer, which would then execute the 
commands to perform the functions listed in the code. 
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distinct work from the previous generation.  The combined 
system of Lindsay’s rules and Brownstein’s computer code 
was named the LCID.  The result was that Lindsay was the 
sole author of the EDS, as an independent work of the LCID, 
Brownstein was the sole author of the ETHN programs, as 
another independent work of the LCID, and they both had an 
equal authorship interest in the LCID as a joint work of the 
EDS and the ETHN programs.   
 Lindsay and Brownstein did much of their work on the 
LCID during company time.  In June 1996, they incorporated 
TAP Systems, Inc. (“TAP”) to commercialize the LCID.  
Lindsay and Brownstein were equal owners of TAP and the 
LCID became known as the TAP system.   
 Lindsay and Brownstein also decided to register the 
copyrights to their work for extra security.  Lindsay received 
her first copyright registration for the EDS in February 1996, 
entitled “An Ethnic Determinant System — Knowledge and 
Rule/Exception Basis”.  Copyright Registration No. TXu 730-
872 (the “‘872 registration”).  Later that year, in December 
1996, Lindsay received a second copyright registration to 
protect her improved version of the EDS, which carried the 
same title.  Copyright Registration No. TXu 778-127 (the 
“‘127 registration”).  As such, the second registration was for 
a “derivative work” of the first registration.3  The difference 
with the second registration is that she included a copy of 
Brownstein’s ETHN programs as a “deposit copy” for the 
‘127 registration and several fields of the registration 
                                                 
3
 As will be discussed infra, a derivative work is an 
independently copyrightable work that is based upon a 
preexisting work.  17 U.S.C. § 101. 
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application referenced a “computer process” and “codes” 
associated with the copyright.
4
  Lindsay applied for and 
secured both copyright registrations on her own, without the 
involvement of Brownstein, and listed herself as the only 
author.  She then gave Brownstein a copy of the copyright 
registrations to hold for safekeeping — he claims that he 
never reviewed the registrations until many years later, 
shortly before trial. 
 In the fall of 1996, Lindsay and Tom Raskin, an 
executive at LSDI, had a confrontation over the copyright 
registration she had filed earlier that year for the EDS, which 
Brownstein overheard and recounted in a 1997 affidavit.  
Raskin demanded that she turn over the copyright registration 
to him because he believed that LSDI was the rightful owner 
of her system.  Lindsay refused, which infuriated Raskin to 
no end (and would cause Raskin to later sue Lindsay and 
Brownstein).  Eventually, with tension building between the 
LSDI management and the duo, and their venture gaining 
steam, they both left LSDI in June 1997. 
 Throughout this whole time, Brownstein let Lindsay 
handle TAP’s business affairs.  He was so focused on 
programming code for the LCID that he claims that he did not 
know of a 1997 software license purportedly granting TAP 
ownership of the LCID until 2009. 
2. The Progress of TAP  
                                                 
4
 As will also be discussed infra, a deposit copy must be 
submitted with most registrations in order to provide an 
example of the registered work.  17 U.S.C. §§ 407(a), 408(b). 
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 Over the course of several years, Lindsay executed a 
number of agreements to form new business entities to 
promote the LCID and to transfer ownership of the LCID to 
those entities. 
 On June 1, 1997, Lindsay unilaterally attempted to 
grant TAP ownership of the LCID (the combined system of 
her rules and Brownstein’s ETHN programs).  (App. 663 
(Software License Agreement, June 1, 1997).)  By doing so, 
Lindsay had hoped that TAP would own the LCID and be 
able to exploit it freely.  Lindsay was the only signatory to 
that 1997 Software License — she signed both as the 
“Copyright Holder” of the LCID and the agent of TAP.  
Brownstein was not a signatory to the license, nor was he 
asked to be one. 
 Later that year, Lindsay and Brownstein decided to 
partner with one of their former employers, Consumers 
Marketing Research, Inc. (“CMR”), to create E-Tech, a joint 
venture between the two companies.  A September 26, 1997 
License Agreement (the “1997 Agreement”) was signed only 
by Linsday and CMR’s executive, Ginger Nelson.  The 1997 
Agreement listed Lindsay and Brownstein as executive 
officers of the new venture (which was just called the “LLC” 
until a superseding agreement in 2000 formally named the 
venture “Ethnic Technologies, LLC”).  (App. 631.)  The 
parties agreed to combine CMR’s technology with the LCID 
(which was referred to as the “TAP SYSTEM”), the 
combination of which would be called the E-Tech system. 
The agreement also acknowledged that TAP owned the 
LCID.  The superseding December 28, 2000 Agreement (the 
“2000 Agreement”) largely mirrored the 1997 Agreement, 
except that it formally called the joint venture “Ethnic 
Technologies, LLC” and the combined system “E-Tech”.  
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(App. 639.)  Lindsay and Nelson were also the only 
signatories to the 2000 Agreement, although Brownstein 
initialed three corrections made to the agreement.  (App. 640-
41.)  Thus, while Brownstein can be imputed with knowledge 
of these agreements as a 50% owner of TAP and an executive 
of E-Tech, he never signed the agreements.   
 As an E-Tech executive, Brownstein executed five 
licensing agreements to E-Tech customers between 2000 and 
2005.  (App. 695-702 (2001 Agreement with Edith Roman 
Associates); App. 702-06 (2002 Agreement with Wells 
Fargo); App. 707-13 (2002 Agreement with Penn Media); 
App. 714-20 (2003 Agreement with Merkle Data 
Technologies); App. 721-27 (2005 Agreement with Central 
Address Systems, Inc.).)  One of these agreements 
acknowledged that the E-Tech system was the “exclusive 
property” of E-Tech, while the four others acknowledged that 




3. The Aftermath 
 The remainder of Brownstein’s relationship with E-
Tech was marred by three lawsuits: the first initiated by LSDI 
in federal court, the second initiated by him in New Jersey 
state court, and the third initiated by him in federal court.  
Although Brownstein did not sign any of the aforementioned 
licensing agreements (including the 1997 Software License, 
1997 Agreement, and 2000 Agreement), he did sign the two 
settlement agreements related to litigation with LSDI in 1998 
and the New Jersey state court oppressed shareholder lawsuit 
in 2009. 
 In 1998, LSDI and Raskin (Lindsay and Brownstein’s 
former employer) sued TAP in the District of New Jersey 
over its use of the LCID.  That action eventually settled in 
September 1998, with LSDI retaining rights to the ETHN 
programs written up to that point (and any derivative works 
or modifications thereof), referred to as the “LSDI Program”, 
and TAP retaining the rights to the EDS (and any derivative 
works or modifications thereof).
5
   
 The September 18, 1998 Settlement Agreement (the 
“1998 Settlement Agreement”) from the LSDI litigation 
stated 1) that Lindsay and Brownstein would not claim rights 
to certain computer programs and derivatives or 
modifications thereof (the “LSDI Program”) and 2) that they 
had rights to Lindsay’s copyrights.  (App. 2768-69 
(Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 1-3).)  Notably, the 1998 
                                                 
5
 We need not determine whether post-1998 versions of the 
ETHN programs are derivative works of the LSDI Program 
since that issue is not before us on appeal.  
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Settlement Agreement equated the EDS with the LCID 
(“EDS which may be called LCID”) — the District Court in 
this litigation found this to be a critical fact.
6
  (App. 2769 
(Settlement Agreement ¶ 3).) 
 In May 2009, Brownstein left E-Tech on bad terms.  
He filed an oppressed shareholder lawsuit against Lindsay 
and E-Tech in the Superior Court of New Jersey.  This 
litigation settled in May 2010.  During this period, 
Brownstein filed for his own copyright registrations in 
December 2009, which covered his ETHN programs.   
 The May 25, 2010 Settlement Agreement (the “2010 
Settlement Agreement”) from the New Jersey state court 
oppressed shareholder lawsuit 1) stated that the terms of the 
settlement would not affect the lawsuit leading to this appeal, 
which was then pending, 2) forced Brownstein to relinquish 
his interests in E-Tech, and 3) released the defendants 
(Lindsay and E-Tech) and Brownstein from related claims.  
(App. 519-24 (Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 2.6, 3.3, 5.1.1, 
5.1.2).)  Specifically, this 2010 Settlement Agreement vitiated 
Brownstein’s “right, title, and interest” as a “shareholder, 
officer, employee or director in TAP or as manager, partner, 
member, officer, director or employee of E-Tech”.  (App. 
520-21 (Settlement Agreement ¶ 2.6).) 
 Nevertheless, it was not until March 2010 that 
Brownstein took affirmative steps to protect his joint 
authorship of the LCID by filing the instant lawsuit seeking 
                                                 
6
 As will be noted infra, the District Court’s assumption was 
incorrect because the 1998 Settlement Agreement could not 
define the scope of Brownstein’s and Lindsay’s copyrights.  
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declaratory judgment of his authorship of the LCID (and, by 
virtue thereof, his ETHN programs) against Lindsay and E-
Tech.  This lawsuit was instigated by Lindsay’s 2010 
deposition testimony for the New Jersey oppressed 
shareholder lawsuit, in which she confirmed what Brownstein 
had not intuited until then: She had submitted Brownstein’s 
ETHN programs with her second copyright registration, the 
‘127 registration, and might be claiming sole authorship of 
the LCID as a result.  In total, he waited 14 years from the 
date of Lindsay’s copyright registrations, 1996, to file a 
lawsuit.   
B. THE DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS 
 On March 22, 2010, Brownstein filed his complaint in 
this instant action, which sought a declaratory judgment of 
joint authorship of the LCID, an accounting of the profits 
from his joint authorship of the LCID, and replevin of 
physical copies of the ETHN programs allegedly kept at E-
Tech’s offices.  Lindsay and E-Tech filed a counterclaim to 
cancel Brownstein’s 2009 copyright registrations to the 
ETHN programs. 
 In February 2012, a jury trial was held in this action — 
the only witnesses called were Brownstein and Lindsay.  
Brownstein testified first; Lindsay was then called and 
Brownstein’s counsel conducted his direct examination.  
Before Appellees’ counsel called Lindsay as their own 
witness, Appellees moved under Rule 50 for judgment as a 
matter of law.  The following day, the District Court heard 





1. The Rule 50(a) Ruling from the Bench (Brownstein’s 
Claim for Joint Authorship of the LCID) 
 The District Court granted Rule 50(a) judgment as a 
matter of law in favor of Appellees on Brownstein’s joint 
authorship claim.
7
  Foremost, the basis of the District Court’s 
ruling was that the statute of limitations under the Copyright 
Act had run since Brownstein had adequate notice of his 
authorship claim more than three years prior to filing his 
complaint.  (App. 1127-34 (Trial Tr. 333:9-340:3).)  As the 
District Court framed it, “[W]hy did [Brownstein] wait 14 
years and [until after] all of the other ensuing events without 
saying anything about it?”  (App. 1130 (Trial Tr. 336:15-16).)   
 Under the “discovery rule”, the District Court found 
that there were sufficient “storm warnings” to Brownstein 
that Lindsay was claiming sole authorship of the LCID, as far 
back as 1996.  Finding that Lindsay’s act of registering her 
copyrights started the statute of limitations running, the 
District Court explained that “there is evidence that the 
injurious act [of Lindsay applying for copyright registration] 
was actually known as far back as 1996.”  (App. 1131 (Trial 
Tr. 337:13-21).)  The District Court found it dispositive that 
Brownstein not only had the copyright registrations in his 
possession but that he also had “actual knowledge” of the 
series of agreements and the 1996 argument between Lindsay 
and Raskin, all of which showed that Lindsay was holding 
herself out as the sole author of the LCID.  (App. 1133 (Trial 
Tr. 339:10-24).)  In particular, the District Court found that 
Brownstein had conceded that Lindsay’s copyright 
                                                 
7
 There was also the replevin claim that the District Court 
dismissed, but Brownstein has not appealed this decision.   
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registrations covered the LCID because he signed the 1998 
Settlement Agreement, which the District Court paraphrased 
as stating that “Tina Lindsay obtained a Certificate of 
Registration from the copyright office in 1996 for EDS, 
which may be called LCID.”  (App. 1132 (Trial Tr. 338:5-9).) 
 The District Court reasoned that “every . . . piece of 
evidence in this case contradict[ed]” Brownstein’s testimony 
that he had no clue that Lindsay was claiming to be the sole 
author of the LCID (including his ETHN computer programs) 
until she gave her 2010 deposition.  (App. 1133 (Trial Tr. 
339:5-9).)  From this, the District Court concluded not only 
that Brownstein had constructive knowledge that Lindsay 
considered herself the sole author but also that he had actual 
knowledge of it.  The District Court also concluded that there 
was no evidence that Lindsay ever considered Brownstein a 
co-author of the LCID.   
 The District Court further ruled that Brownstein was 
not a co-author of the LCID or of his computer programs 
because “there is no evidence to support this claim of co-
authorship in the record.”  (App. 1133 (Trial Tr. 339:5-12).)  
Therefore, the District Court reasoned, even if he was not 
barred by the discovery rule and the statute of limitations, his 
claim would still fail on the merits.   
2. The Summary Judgment Opinion (Lindsay and E-
Tech’s Counterclaim to Cancel Brownstein’s Copyright 
Registrations) 
 After it granted Appellees’ Rule 50 motion on 
Brownstein’s authorship claim, the District Court issued an 
opinion granting summary judgment on Appellees’ 
counterclaim to cancel Brownstein’s two copyright 
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registrations.  The District Court found that it had authority to 
cancel Brownstein’s copyright registrations because the 
“threshold determination as to the ownership of the works at 
issue is to be made by the Court, as [Appellees] seek to 
invalidate the registration because [Brownstein] had no right 
to register the work, not because of some regulatory defect.” 
(App. 12-13 (Summ. J. Op. at 4-5).)  The District Court 
proceeded to cancel Brownstein’s copyright registrations 
because it had “previously found . . . that [Brownstein’s] co-
authorship claim was without merit” in deciding the Rule 50 
motion.  (App. 13 (Summ. J. Op. at 5).)  Thus, it concluded 
that Brownstein had no authorship interest in the LCID or his 
ETHN programs and that all of the LCID and its derivatives 
were created for TAP and owned exclusively by TAP.  (App. 
13 (Summ. J. Op. at 5).)  The District Court noted that, 
“specifically, the 1997 and 2000 agreements[] refer to the 
relevant programs as belonging exclusively to TAP.”  (App. 
13 (Summ. J. Op. at 5).)  The District Court also found that 
the 2010 Settlement Agreement from the New Jersey 
oppressed shareholder lawsuit relieved Brownstein of any 
“right, title and interest” in TAP and E-Tech, including the 
LCID, which it found that TAP and E-Tech owned.  (App. 13 
(Summ. J. Op. at 5).) 
II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331, 1338, and 1367.  We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
 Our review of a judgment as a matter of law under 
Rule 50(a) is plenary.  Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 
966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996).  “A motion for judgment as a matter 
15 
 
of law under Federal Rule [of Civil Procedure] 50(a) ‘should 
be granted only if, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no question of 
material fact for the jury and any verdict other than the one 
directed would be erroneous under the governing law.’”  Id. 
(quoting Macleary v. Hines, 817 F.2d 1081, 1083 (3d Cir. 
1987)). 
 Our review of a district court’s grant of summary 
judgment is plenary.  William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey, 
568 F.3d 425, 437 (3d Cir. 2009).  Summary judgment may 
only be granted if there is no genuine dispute as to a material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
III. ANALYSIS 
 Our Circuit has rarely had occasion to venture into the 
area of joint authorship under the Copyright Act.  In Andrien 
v. Southern Ocean County Chamber of Commerce, 927 F.2d 
132 (3d Cir. 1991), we touched upon the issue in determining 
whether a printer’s contribution to the printing of a map gave 
it joint authorship of the map or whether such contributions 
through printing were works for hire.  This is the first time 
that our Circuit has faced a joint authorship claim squarely on 
the merits. 
 In granting Appellees’ Rule 50 motion, the District 
Court decided two factual issues.  The first issue was whether 
Brownstein was a co-author of the LCID.  If he was deemed a 
co-author, the second issue was whether his joint authorship 
claim was barred by the statute of limitations because he was 
put on inquiry notice that Lindsay had disclaimed his co-
authorship.  In deciding both of these issues, the District 
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Court erred because these were factual determinations that 
should have been left to the jury.  When viewed in the light 
most favorable to Brownstein, the evidence presented at trial 
could allow him to succeed on his joint authorship claim.   
 In granting summary judgment on Appellees’ 
counterclaim, the District Court determined that it had the 
authority to invalidate Brownstein’s copyright registrations.  
For the reasons that follow, the District Court should not have 
granted summary judgment on the counterclaim because it 
had no authority to cancel Brownstein’s copyright 
registrations. 
 We will address each of these three issues in turn — 
whether Brownstein was a co-author of the LCID, whether 
his claim is barred by the statute of limitations, and whether 
the District Court had authority to cancel Brownstein’s 
copyright registrations. 
A. JOINT AUTHORSHIP  
 In order to reach the issue of when Brownstein’s 
authorship claim arose and accrued, we must first determine 
if he was a co-author of the LCID. 
1. The LCID as a Joint Work 
 The issue at the root of this case is whether Brownstein 
is a co-author of the LCID, which depends on whether the 
LCID is a joint work.  When two or more people create a 
“joint work”, they become co-authors and co-owners of the 
work, each entitled to “undivided ownership in the entire 
work”.  1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on 
Copyright § 6.03 [hereinafter Nimmer on Copyright]; see 17 
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U.S.C. § 101 (defining a “joint work”); Andrien, 927 F.2d at 
136.  This ownership interest vests from the act of creating 
the work, rather than from any sort of agreement between the 
authors or any act of registration with the Copyright Office.   
 For two or more people to become co-authors, each 
author must contribute some non-trivial amount of creative, 
original, or intellectual expression to the work and both must 
intend that their contributions be combined.  1 Nimmer on 
Copyright § 6.07; see Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 
658-59 (7th Cir. 2004).  The components must also be 
“inseparable or interdependent” parts of a whole but each co-
author’s contribution need not be equal for them to have an 
equal stake in the work as a whole.  17 U.S.C. § 101; 1 
Nimmer on Copyright § 6.03.  Thus, if Person A writes lyrics 
to a song and intends for a composer to write the score, 
Person B who writes the score becomes a co-author in the 
work.  See Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 659 (providing the example 
of two co-authors, one a professor with brilliant ideas and the 
other an excellent writer); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 
504 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that a lyricist and composer of a 
song were co-authors “even though the lyricist wrote the 
words before he knew the identity of the composer who 
would later write the music”).    
 At oral argument, Appellees conceded that Brownstein 
and Lindsay were co-authors of the LCID up until its 1997 
iteration.  Oral Arg. at 17:10-19:00, 21:21-28 (July 10, 2013).  
This concession means that Appellees admit that Brownstein 
contributed a non-trivial amount of creative expression to the 
LCID through his work on the ETHN programs and that 
Lindsay intended for the EDS to be combined with the 
computer code he drafted to form the LCID.  Moreover, this 
framework concedes that the EDS and the ETHN programs 
18 
 
are interdependent works, which comports with Lindsay’s 
assertions.  In both the 1997 Software License and her 
testimony at trial, she admitted that her rules and 
Brownstein’s code were inseparable.  (App. 1050 (Trial Tr. 
256:1 (“[The] LCID had to have programs.”)).)  In Schedule 
A of the license, she wrote that the “series of computer 
programs” and “system data” of the LCID were “irrevocably 
entwined”.  (App. 668 (Software License Agreement, 
Schedule A).)   
 Importantly, this concession also means that Appellees 
admit that the ETHN programs were not works for hire, as 
Lindsay had insinuated in some of her testimony at trial.  The 
District Court also concluded that the ETHN programs were 
works for hire in granting summary judgment on Appellees’ 
counterclaim, which was an argument that Appellees 
advanced in their answer and which we find to be in error. 
 To analogize here, Lindsay wrote the lyrics, while 
Brownstein composed the score.  The exception to this joint 
authorship rule is the “work for hire” rule, where a 
collaborator creates his contribution to the work as part of his 
employment or for a commission.
8
  17 U.S.C. § 201(b); 1 
Nimmer on Copyright § 5.03.  In such a case, authorship 
inures to the employer or commissioner.  17 U.S.C. § 201(b).   
                                                 
8
 A classic example of a work made for hire is a magazine 
article written by an editor employed by the magazine’s 
company.  Unless they agree otherwise, the editor’s 
employer, the magazine’s company, owns the copyright to his 




 A work for hire requires that the work be made by an 
employee within the scope of his or her employment or that 
the work be commissioned.  17 U.S.C. § 101; see 1 Nimmer 
on Copyright § 5.03; Marco v. Accent Publ’g Co., 969 F.2d 
1547, 1549-50 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Warren Freedenfeld 
Assocs., Inc. v. McTigue, 531 F.3d 38, 48 (1st Cir. 2008).  At 
trial, Lindsay claimed that she directed Brownstein on how to 
turn her rules into computer code.  (App. 1051 (Trial Tr. 
257:19-22 (“At my direction. I told him exactly what to 
write.”)).)  On the other hand, Brownstein had to use his own 
intellectual creativity to select the computer commands to 
use.  He controverted Lindsay’s testimony on the stand when 
he testified that he automated Lindsay’s manually inputted 
list of rules and names, which gave Brownstein “[q]uite a bit 
[of discretion]” in how he coded the ETHN programs.  (App. 
910 (Trial Tr. 116:8-10).) 
 By every indication, and given Appellees’ concession, 
Brownstein’s computer programs were not works for hire.  17 
U.S.C. § 201(b).  Brownstein was both an officer and 
shareholder of TAP and an officer of E-Tech.  He was not an 
employee of TAP or E-Tech; nor was he commissioned to 
write the code by TAP or Lindsay.  Most importantly, he was 
not compensated for the express purpose of writing code for 
them. 
2. The Effect of Lindsay’s and Brownstein’s Copyright 
Registrations 
 Pivotal to this case is distinguishing an author’s 
interest in the copyright to his work from the registration of 
his work.  A “copyright”, as a right, vests immediately upon 
the creation of the work.  17 U.S.C. § 201(a).  For this reason, 
a copyright must not be confused with the act of registering 
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that right.  Registration serves primarily to create a record of 
the creation of the work and it also allows the author to bring 
civil claims under the Copyright Act.  17 U.S.C. § 411(a); 2 
Nimmer on Copyright § 7.16.   
 With few exceptions, a deposit copy must be submitted 
with an application for copyright registration.  17 U.S.C. §§ 
407(a), 408(b).  A deposit copy does not necessarily limit the 
copyrightable work itself.  2 Nimmer on Copyright § 7.17.  
Here, a deposit copy means that Lindsay sent a physical 
printout of Brownstein’s code to the Copyright Office for 
safekeeping (and was only sent a deposit receipt in return), 
which would serve an “archival function” in the event of 
infringement and help elucidate her copyrightable work.  Id.   
a. Lindsay’s Copyrights and Copyright Registrations 
 Due to the District Court’s conflation of the EDS and 
the LCID, which are distinct works with distinct copyrights, it 
was misled into finding that Lindsay’s copyright registrations 
covered the entire LCID, including Brownstein’s ETHN 
programs.  This false premise then led the District Court one 
step further to conclude that Lindsay could unilaterally 
transfer ownership of the LCID through the trio of licensing 
agreements that she executed.  The District Court largely 
assumed that her copyright registrations covered the entire 
LCID because Brownstein’s ETHN programs were included 
as a “deposit copy” with her second registration.  But the 
District Court’s assumption is belied by the copyright 
registrations themselves and the law undergirding the 
registration process.  Lindsay’s copyright registrations only 
cover the EDS. 
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 Lindsay’s registrations did not extend to the LCID as a 
whole or the ETHN programs.  Notably, Lindsay’s first 
registration was entitled “An Ethnic Determinant System — 
Knowledge and Rule/Exception Basis”, which 
unambiguously refers to the EDS, her system of rules.  Her 
second registration had the same title and was marked as a 
derivative work of the first, so it, too, only covered the EDS.  
The most significant difference between her two registrations 
is that the second registration included Brownstein’s ETHN 
programs as the deposit copy and described the EDS as “[a] 
computer system process and data rules” in the Nature of 
Authorship field of the registration application.  She also 
wrote “[a]dditional ethnic categories, additional rules, names, 
codes . . . [d]escription of computer process included” in 
another field of the second registration.  Nowhere, though, 
did she write “ETHN programs” in the registration.  
Accordingly, her registrations could not claim ownership of 
the ETHN programs simply based on the contents of the 
deposit copy. 
 The District Court’s reliance on the deposit copy as an 
indication of the second registration’s scope was also 
misguided.  Lindsay, herself, admitted as much at trial.  She 
testified that the deposit copy did not reflect the scope of her 
copyrights or authorship, explaining that the deposit copy of 
the ETHN programs was only meant to provide “an example” 
of how the EDS would be implemented, not to claim 
ownership of Brownstein’s programs.  (App. 1049 (Trial Tr. 
255:1-4).)   
 Thus, the fact that Lindsay submitted Brownstein’s 
code in the form of the deposit copy does not establish that 
she held a copyright to his ETHN programs or the LCID as a 
whole.  Since Brownstein, alone, wrote the code, the only 
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rights Lindsay could have had to his code would flow through 
the LCID as a joint work with her rules.  Further, even if her 
registrations covered the LCID and were entitled “The LCID, 
Including the ETHN Programs”, that act would not vest 
exclusive ownership of the LCID in Lindsay.  Brownstein 
would remain a co-author and co-owner because copyright 
registration does not establish the copyright, which attaches at 
the moment of creation.  Consequently, Lindsay’s copyright 
registrations, if anything, are merely placeholders for the 
indivisible joint rights she inherently had in the EDS and the 
LCID with Brownstein.   
b. Brownstein’s Copyrights and Copyright Registrations 
 As mentioned above, Brownstein had copyrights 
exclusively in his ETHN programs as an independent work 
and non-exclusively in the LCID as a co-author.  In addition, 
he also had copyrights to whatever new generations of the 
ETHN programs and LCID that he created as “derivative 
works” of his first set of ETHN programs and the LCID.  
Therefore, although LSDI retained rights to the ETHN 
programs that were considered the “LSDI Program” in the 
1998 Settlement Agreement, the subsequent generations of 
ETHN programs that Brownstein developed remained under 
his ownership because they were derivative works of the 
LSDI Program.  Brownstein’s 2009 copyright registrations 
would, therefore, cover any post-1998 generations of the 
ETHN programs that were not covered by the 1998 
Settlement Agreement with LSDI. 
3. Derivative Works of the LCID 
 At oral argument, Appellees contended that the post-
1997 versions of the LCID are derivative works and that, 
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therefore, Brownstein has no rights to these improved 
versions of the LCID.  Appellees are correct in one respect 
and wrong in another: The post-1997 versions of the LCID 
may indeed be derivative works but Brownstein retains an 
interest in the post-1997 versions of the LCID insofar as they 
are based on any version of the LCID to which he is a co-
author.  It is possible that the post-1997 versions of the LCID 
continued to employ the code created by Brownstein, but 
such a determination would require additional factual 
development at trial. 
 Derivative works are works that build upon and 
improve a previous work, such as a remix of an old song.  17 
U.S.C. § 103.  While the original work may be copyrightable, 
a derivative work is copyrightable on its own basis.  Id.; 1 
Nimmer on Copyright § 3.04.  Derivative work protection 
only extends to those parts of the derivative work that are 
novel beyond the original work and the author or authors of 
the underlying work retain their rights to their original work.  
See Dam Things from Denmark, a/k/a Troll Co. ApS v. Russ 
Berrie & Co., 290 F.3d 548, 563 (3d Cir. 2002).   
 A copyright is better described as a bundle of rights: 
the right to reproduce the copyrighted work, the right to 
prepare derivative works from the copyrighted work, and the 
right to perform or display the copyrighted work.  17 U.S.C. § 
106; see Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 2007).  
Thus, the author has the exclusive right to produce derivative 
works.  See Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc. v. Grace 
Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 212-13 (3d Cir. 2002); Dam 
Things from Denmark, 290 F.3d at 563-64.  If the original 
work is copyrightable, then the original author or authors 
must consent to the creation of a derivative work by a third 
party — unauthorized creation of a derivative work, which 
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incorporates the original work, constitutes an infringement of 
the underlying work.  17 U.S.C. § 106; 1 Nimmer on 
Copyright § 3.04; Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc., 
307 F.3d at 212-13; Dam Things from Denmark, 290 F.3d at 
563-64. 
 As a result, even if Brownstein is not a co-author of 
some of the derivative versions of the LCID, he remains the 
co-author of the underlying work and has an ownership 
interest in derivative versions of the LCID to the extent that 
they incorporate the underlying work.  The extent of 
Brownstein’s authorship and ownership of these derivative 
works is a factual question that must be decided by a jury. 
4. The License and Settlement Agreements 
 Having defined the inherent copyrights of Lindsay and 
Brownstein, the next question is what rights were conveyed 
by the series of license and settlement agreements.  Some 
agreements purport to grant licenses, while some purport to 
transfer ownership, but it is not at all clear which agreements 
accomplish what.   
 With respect to licensing a joint work, each co-author 
is entitled to convey non-exclusive rights to the joint work 
without the consent of his co-author.  1 Nimmer on Copyright 
§ 6.10.  See Davis, 505 F.3d at 98-100.  The only caveat is 
that the licensing author must account to his co-author for his 
fair share of profits from any non-exclusive license.  1 
Nimmer on Copyright § 6.12.  If a co-author attempts to 
convey exclusive rights, his co-author can convey the same 
exclusive rights — in effect, such an exclusive license 
becomes a non-exclusive license.  Id. § 6.10; see Davis, 505 
F.3d at 100-01 (“A co-owner may grant a non-exclusive 
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license to use the work unilaterally, because his co-owners 
may also use the work or grant similar licenses to other users 
and because the non-exclusive license presumptively does not 
diminish the value of the copyright to the co-owners.”).  
Accordingly, the only way for truly exclusive rights to be 
conveyed to a joint work is for all co-authors to consent to 
such an exclusive conveyance.  As with tenants in common of 
real property, a co-author can transfer or assign the rights to 
his ownership interest in the joint work, but this does not 
affect the ownership rights of his co-author.  1 Nimmer on 
Copyright § 6.11; Davis, 505 F.3d at 99-100.   
 With respect to transferring the ownership of a joint 
work, a co-author cannot transfer the ownership interest of his 
co-author.  The Copyright Act’s “statute of frauds” requires 
that any transfer of an ownership interest must be signed and 
in writing.  17 U.S.C. § 204(a); see Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. 
Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 827 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 Due to Appellees’ concession that Brownstein was a 
co-author of the LCID through 1997, Lindsay could not have 
transferred ownership of the LCID before 1998 without 
Brownstein’s consent in a writing with his signature.  Even if 
Lindsay’s registrations covered the entire LCID, she would 
have had no authority to convey an exclusive license to the 
joint work of the LCID without Brownstein’s consent and 
could only have assigned the rights to her own ownership 
interest in the LCID.  1 Nimmer on Copyright §§ 6.10, 6.11; 
see Davis, 505 F.3d at 99-100.   
 Under these facts, Lindsay could have only conveyed a 
non-exclusive license to the LCID to TAP (and, subsequently, 
to E-Tech).  Such non-exclusive licenses to the LCID would 
have no effect on Brownstein’s copyrights and ownership 
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interest in his ETHN programs and the LCID.  Accordingly, 
the only set of rights to which Lindsay could have conveyed 
an exclusive license or transferred ownership on her own 
would be to the EDS, of which she was the sole author.  If 
Lindsay did transfer her ownership of the EDS to TAP, that, 
too, would not have disturbed Brownstein’s rights. 
 Since the 1997 Agreement and 2000 Agreement both 
emanate from the rights conveyed in the 1997 Software 
License, those two agreements rise and fall with the 1997 
Software License.  Since the software license did not transfer 
Brownstein’s ownership interest in the LCID as a joint work, 
neither could the 1997 Agreement or 2000 Agreement.  The 
2010 Settlement Agreement did divest Brownstein of any 
interest he had in TAP and E-Tech.  But, if TAP and E-Tech 
never had exclusive rights to Brownstein’s ETHN programs 
as part of the LCID, then Brownstein could not be divested of 
those rights via the 2010 Settlement Agreement.  Moreover, 
the 2010 Settlement Agreement only quashed Brownstein’s 
“right, title, and interest” as a “shareholder, officer, employee 
or director in TAP or as manager, partner, member, officer, 
director or employee of E-Tech”.  It says nothing specifically 
about his rights as co-author of the LCID or sole author of the 
ETHN programs. 
 In sum, Brownstein’s copyrights and ownership 
interest in his ETHN programs (and, by virtue thereof, the 
LCID) were not affected by the series of agreements, except 
to the extent that the 1998 LSDI Settlement Agreement 
abrogated his ownership of the pre-1998 generations of the 




B. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
 Even though Brownstein is a co-author of the LCID 
through 1997 and possibly a co-author of derivative versions 
of the LCID created thereafter, an open question remains 
about whether the statute of limitations has run on his 
authorship claim.  The statute of limitations under the 
Copyright Act is three years for all civil actions.
9
  17 U.S.C. § 
507(b).  Here, Brownstein must show that his joint authorship 
claim did not begin to accrue until March 22, 2007, at the 
latest. 
1. Inquiry Notice of Brownstein’s Authorship Claim 
 Once Brownstein was on inquiry notice of his 
authorship claim, his cause of action began to accrue and the 
statute of limitations began to run.  Deciding when 
Brownstein was on inquiry notice of his authorship claim 
depends on two determinations: 1) when a cause of action 
first arose and 2) when he should have known that a cause of 
action had arisen.  In our Circuit, the discovery rule governs 
the second determination, while we adopt the express 
repudiation rule from our sister circuits to govern the first. 
                                                 
9
 Brownstein argues that the statute of limitations does not 
even apply since Lindsay’s copyright registrations and 
agreements only related to the EDS and Brownstein is only 
seeking a declaration that he is a co-author of the LCID.  
(Appellant’s Reply Br. 11-15.) While it is true that Lindsay’s 
testimony at trial is internally inconsistent, Lindsay is still 
asserting in her counterclaim that she is the sole author of the 
LCID, which contests Brownstein’s joint authorship of the 
LCID.   
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a. The Discovery Rule  
 We follow the “discovery rule” in determining when a 
cause of action begins to accrue.  The discovery rule is a 
general inquiry notice rule, which states that a claim accrues 
when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered with 
“due diligence” that his rights had been violated.  William A. 
Graham Co., 568 F.3d at 438.  In William A. Graham Co., we 
extended the discovery rule to copyright actions, noting that 
eight of our sister circuits had done the same.  Id. at 433-37.  
We held that a plaintiff would be able to discover his injury 
with due diligence if there were “storm warnings” which gave 
the plaintiff “sufficient information of possible wrongdoing to 
place [him] on inquiry notice . . . of culpable activity.”  Id. at 
438 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The discovery rule 
also holds that the clock only starts running once a cause of 
action arises since a plaintiff cannot experience storm 
warnings of a violation until his rights have been violated.  Id. 
at 438-39.  Consequently, prospective plaintiffs have no duty 
to investigate future causes of action.  Id. at 439. 
b. Express Repudiation 
 Since Graham does not establish when a cause of 
action arises for declaration of authorship, we must turn to 
our sister circuits for guidance.
10
 
                                                 
10
 As of 1996, the Ninth Circuit observed that “[t]here is a 
surprising lack of precedent on the question of when a cause 
of action claiming co-ownership of a copyright accrues.”   
Zuill v. Shanahan, 80 F.3d 1366, 1370 (9th Cir. 1996).  
Likewise, as of 2005, the Eastern District of Michigan 
commented that “[t]here is surprisingly sparse precedent on 
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 The Ninth Circuit, Seventh Circuit, and Second Circuit 
have adopted an “express repudiation” rule, such that a joint 
authorship claim arises and an author is alerted to the 
potential violation of his rights when his authorship has been 
expressly repudiated by his co-author.  See Zuill, 80 F.3d at 
1370-71; Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 653; Gary Friedrich Enters., 
LLC v. Marvel Characters, Inc., 716 F.3d 302, 317 (2d Cir. 
2013).  Thus, in assessing the accrual of a joint authorship 
claim, we will apply the discovery rule to the express 
repudiation rule.  Fusing these two concepts, the discovery 
rule will only apply once a plaintiff’s authorship has been 
expressly repudiated since he can only be on inquiry notice 
once his rights have been violated. 
 This express repudiation rule spawned from a Ninth 
Circuit case, Zuill v. Shanahan, 80 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1996).  
Since Zuill, only a smattering of circuit cases have endorsed 
the rule.  See Cambridge Literary Props., Ltd. v. W. Goebel 
Porzellanfabrik G.m.b.H. & Co. KG., 510 F.3d 77, 88-89, 91 
(1st Cir. 2007); Roger Miller Music, Inc. v. Sony/ATV Publ’g, 
LLC, 477 F.3d 383, 389-90 (6th Cir. 2007).  Similar to the 
discovery rule, the express repudiation rule looks for evidence 
that a co-author has acted adversely to the plaintiff’s status as 
a co-author.
11
  See Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 653; Zuill, 80 F.3d at 
                                                                                                             
the question of when a cause of action claiming co-ownership 
of a copyright accrues.”  Diamond v. Gillis, 357 F. Supp. 2d 
1003, 1006 (E.D. Mich. 2005).   
11
 In Zuill, the plaintiffs’ joint authorship was expressly 
repudiated when the co-creator of Hooked on Phonics made 
declarations that he was the “sole” owner of the contested 
copyrights in a compensation contract reviewed by the 
putative co-creators of the music and the co-creators saw a 
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1370-71; Gary Friedrich Enters., LLC, 716 F.3d at 317-19; 
see also Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1230-31 (9th 
Cir. 2000); Merchant v. Levy, 92 F.3d 51, 53, 56 (2d Cir. 
1996).  Many of these cases analogize co-authors of 
copyrights to tenants in common of real property.  See Zuill, 
80 F.3d at 1370; Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 654; Davis, 505 F.3d at 
98-99. 
 Applied here, Brownstein’s injury occurred whenever 
Lindsay expressly repudiated his joint authorship of the 
LCID.  This required that Lindsay do something that 
communicated not merely that she is the author, but that she 
is the sole author or that Brownstein is not a co-author.
12
  For 
                                                                                                             
published version of the work with the defendant listed as the 
only author.  80 F.3d at 1368.  In Gaiman, the plaintiff’s joint 
authorship claim was expressly repudiated when the 
defendant sent a letter to him which stated that “all rights . . . 
shall continue to be owned” by the defendant’s company.  
360 F.3d at 652.  Unlike Brownstein, the plaintiffs in those 
cases had no ownership interest in the entity that was claimed 
to own the putative copyrights and they were directly shown a 
document with a declaration of the defendants’ sole 
authorship. 
12
 A critical nuance is that Lindsay’s assertion of her sole 
authorship to unspecified copyrights in an agreement is not an 
express repudiation of Brownstein’s co-authorship of the 
LCID and his sole authorship of his ETHN computer 
programs.  If Lindsay’s copyrights did not cover the joint 
work of the LCID but, instead, only the EDS, then her 
declarations as sole author of her copyrights would have said 
nothing about Brownstein’s authorship of his computer code.  
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instance, this would occur if Brownstein became aware that 
she was claiming that she was the sole author of the LCID in 
an agreement or if Brownstein overheard a conversation 
where Lindsay said that she commissioned Brownstein to do 
the work for her as a work for hire.  Or, as in Gaiman and 
Zuill, this would happen if Lindsay directly sent Brownstein a 
letter which stated that she was the sole author of the LCID.  
Express repudiation could also occur if Lindsay was 
exploiting the LCID without remuneration to Brownstein.  
See, e.g., Gary Friedrich Enters., LLC, 716 F.3d at 318-19; 
Cambridge Literary Props., Ltd., 510 F.3d at 91. 
 The District Court considered the date of express 
repudiation (which it characterized as the date of injury) to be 
the date that Lindsay registered her copyrights since, in listing 
herself as the only author of the registration, she was 
implicitly disclaiming Brownstein’s joint authorship.  (App. 
1131 (Trial Tr. 337:13-15 (“In my view, the injurious act 
defined by the statute actually occurred upon the registration 
of the copyright.”)).)  This stretches the meaning of express 
repudiation too thin.  The act of registering a copyright does 
not repudiate co-authorship; put differently, the way to 
expressly repudiate your co-author’s authorship is not to 
register the copyright in your name.   
 As one of our sister circuits has held, a copyright 
registration, standing alone, does not serve as repudiation of 
joint authorship because co-authors are not expected to 
investigate the copyright register for competing registrations.  
See Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 654-55.  But see Saenger Org., Inc. 
v. Nationwide Ins. Licensing Assocs., Inc., 119 F.3d 55, 66 
(1st Cir. 1997) (holding that copyright registration puts the 
world on constructive notice of ownership); Diamond v. 
Gillis, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1007 (E.D. Mich. 2005) 
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(holding that registration of a song qualified as express 
repudiation).  In Gaiman, the Seventh Circuit held that the 
purpose of a copyright registration is “not to start the statute 
of limitations running” because it is not adverse to a co-
author’s interest in the joint work.  360 F.3d at 653-54.   
 The peril of the District Court’s rationale is apparent: 
A challenger to a plaintiff’s authorship could surreptitiously 
apply for copyright registration of the plaintiff’s work to start 
the statute of limitations running and, if the plaintiff did not 
discover the registration until three years thereafter, the 
plaintiff’s authorship would be nullified.   
 Appellees contend that blanket statements in some of 
the agreements declaring Lindsay as the sole author of the 
LCID expressly repudiated Brownstein’s authorship rights.  
We disagree.  The more apt inquiry is whether any statement 
in the agreements was hostile or adverse to Brownstein’s 
authorship rights.  See Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 654; Zuill, 80 
F.3d at 1370.  For repudiation to be express, it must be plain.  
See Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1230-31.  A copyright holder 
should not be required to investigate every whisper and rumor 
that another has declared himself the author of his 
copyrighted work.  See Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 654-55.  A 
whisper or rumor also does not stir up the type of “storm 
warning” that would put an author on inquiry notice.  It 
follows that, if an action is not hostile to an author’s rights, it 
may not be plain that his authorship rights have been 
repudiated. 
 There are several potential sources of express 
repudiation at play: Lindsay’s copyright registrations, the 
1996 argument between Lindsay and LSDI’s Raskin, the trio 
of license agreements (the 1997 Software License, the 1997 
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Agreement, and the 2000 Agreement), the settlement 
agreements (the 1998 Settlement Agreement and the 2010 
Settlement Agreement), and the E-Tech licensing agreements 
executed by Brownstein (from 2000 until 2005).  We will rule 
out one of these sources and leave the others for the jury to 
decide on remand. 
i. Lindsay’s Copyright Registrations 
 Lindsay’s copyright registrations could not have 
expressly repudiated Brownstein’s rights since, by their plain 
language, they only covered the EDS.  As discussed above, 
the deposit copy did not expand the scope of her second 
registration by including Brownstein’s ETHN programs.   
More importantly, as just established, a registration does not 
expressly repudiate authorship. 
ii. The 1996 Argument with Raskin 
 In the 1996 argument, which Brownstein recounted in 
his 1997 affidavit for the LSDI litigation, Lindsay told Raskin 
that “the copyright was in her name because she initiated it 
and did all the work and spent her own money and time to do 
it.”  (App. 2744-45 (Brownstein Aff. ¶ 31).)  This argument 
declared very little expressly about Lindsay’s copyrights: It 
did not identify the work to which she was claiming 
ownership and, at that time, Raskin and LSDI were not yet 
aware of the LCID (they were only aware of the EDS).  As a 
result, this 1996 argument did not necessarily provide 
Brownstein a storm warning that Lindsay was repudiating his 
joint authorship of the LCID.  
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iii. The 1997 Software License 
 The 1997 Software License is key because it is the first 
link in the chain of title that Lindsay supposedly conveyed 
through the trio of agreements — all of the subsequent license 
and settlement agreements turn on what was originally 
conveyed to TAP in this software license.  The 1997 Software 
License purported to give TAP an exclusive license to the 
LCID, which included Lindsay’s rules and Brownstein’s 
computer programs.  (See App. 668 (Software License 
Agreement, Schedule A).)  In her testimony, Lindsay 
explained that this was her intention because the software 
license was supposed “to mak[e] sure that TAP owns both 
[the rules and the computer code]”.  (App. 1066 (Trial Tr. 
272:15-20).)  Lindsay was the only signatory to the license, 
both as the copyright holder and the representative of TAP.  
Brownstein was not a signatory to the agreement, which is the 
foible of Lindsay’s plans. 
 Interestingly, her intention to grant an exclusive 
license to Brownstein’s ETHN programs, as part of the LCID, 
did not actually interfere with Brownstein’s ownership rights.  
As described previously, a co-author is allowed to grant a 
license to the joint work without the consent or involvement 
of her co-author — but such a license is treated like a non-
exclusive license and does not negate the other co-author’s 
ownership interest.  1 Nimmer on Copyright § 6.10; see 
Davis, 505 F.3d at 99-100.  Viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to Brownstein, it is possible that he thought 
that the 1997 Software License merely conveyed a non-
exclusive license for the LCID to TAP rather than declaring 
Lindsay the sole author of the LCID.  Despite her subjective 
thoughts or evaluations, Brownstein’s rights were not 
adversely affected by Lindsay’s actions. 
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 Further, a close look at the agreement shows that the 
language does not state that Lindsay was the exclusive author 
or owner of the entire LCID.  It vaguely calls Lindsay the 
“Copyright Holder” without describing her specific copyright 
interests or referencing her actual copyright registrations.  
(App. 663 (Software License Agreement, June 1, 1997).)  A 
reader might assume from this that she is the sole copyright 
holder of the LCID, but this would only be an assumption and 
not based on the strict language of the agreement.   
iv. The 1997 Agreement and the 2000 Agreement 
 The 1997 Agreement (which partnered TAP with 
CMR) fares no better in Lindsay’s attempt to establish 
express repudiation since it was contingent on the rights held 
by TAP.  The strongest language from this agreement only 
says that “TAP owns all rights, including copyrights” to the 
TAP system, which is the “exclusive property of TAP”.  
(App. 631.)  As discussed above, the 1997 Software License 
could not have conveyed Brownstein’s ownership interest in 
the LCID to TAP without his consent in a signed writing.  At 
most, TAP owned Lindsay’s ownership interest in the LCID. 
 In fact, the 1997 Agreement states that the joint 
venture and the counterparty, CMR, “acknowledge at all 
times that the original TAP SYSTEM [the LCID] remains the 
property of TAP.”  (App. 633.)  How could the property 
interest in the LCID be transferred to a new owner if it 
remained the property of the original owner?  Thus, all the 
agreement actually did was give the joint venture, what would 
become E-Tech, a non-exclusive license to use the LCID and 
allowed E-Tech to combine the LCID with CMR’s 
technology.  It said nothing that was adverse to Brownstein’s 
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ownership interest in the LCID — his rights could co-exist 
with the terms of the 1997 Agreement.   
 Although very similar to the 1997 Agreement, the 
2000 Agreement did convey all of TAP’s assets to the joint 
venture, but this also did not disturb Brownstein’s ownership 
interest in the copyrights to the ETHN programs (and, by 
virtue thereof, the LCID).  As mentioned, all TAP possessed 
was a non-exclusive license to the LCID from the 1997 
Software License and possibly the assignment of Lindsay’s 
ownership interest in the LCID.  Thus, contrary to Lindsay’s 
belief, the 2000 Agreement did not vest E-Tech with 
exclusive ownership over the LCID.  As long as his 
ownership rights remained intact, Brownstein might not have 
seen any storm warnings requiring him to investigate the 
potential repudiation of his authorship.  
v. The 1998 Settlement Agreement 
 The agreement which presents the most potential for 
Lindsay’s argument is the 1998 LSDI Settlement Agreement, 
which Brownstein actually signed and which gave LSDI 
ownership over certain computer code referred to as the 
“LSDI Program”.  Lindsay claims that it decreed her 
exclusive ownership of the LCID by stating that her two 
copyrights cover the EDS “which may be called [the] LCID”, 
but it is not for a settlement agreement to define the scope of 
her copyrights or her copyright registrations.
13
  Such a 
                                                 
13
 A contract or agreement cannot alter copyrights or 
copyright registrations by simply renaming a work since 
nomenclature does not affect the substance or content of a 
work.   
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misnomer did not necessarily serve as a storm warning of 
repudiation of Brownstein’s joint authorship of the LCID.  
Otherwise, it does not say much in her favor. 
 That language only renamed the EDS (which is all her 
exclusive copyrights and her copyright registrations likely 
covered) as the LCID, for the purposes of the agreement.  
Moreover, other language in the agreement controverts any 
exclusive ownership Lindsay would have been given over the 
LCID in the agreement by declaring that “Lindsay, Nelson, 
Brownstein, ET, TAP and CMR . . . are the sole owners of the 
copyrights”.  (App. 2772 (Settlement Agreement ¶ 18).)  
Thus, if the settlement language governed the boundaries of 
the copyrights, then Lindsay would actually have to share 
ownership in her copyrights with Brownstein and the other 
parties to the settlement agreement.  It is surely difficult to 
characterize this as a storm warning — if anything, it might 
have confirmed for Brownstein that his rights to the LCID 
were preserved.  
vi. The 2010 Settlement Agreement   
 The 2010 Settlement Agreement is of little help to 
Lindsay.  She argues that, by disowning any “right, title and 
interest” in E-Tech, Brownstein forfeited his ownership 
interests in his computer code.  But what the agreement 
actually says is that Brownstein forfeited his rights and 
interest as a “shareholder, officer, employee or director in 
TAP or as manager, partner, member, officer, director or 
employee of E-Tech.”  (App. 520-21 (Settlement Agreement 
¶ 2.6).)  There is no basis to argue that Brownstein’s 
independent ownership rights in his ETHN programs were 
subsumed in his positions in TAP or E-Tech.  Further, as 
noted earlier, it is doubtful that TAP or E-Tech ever had 
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exclusive ownership of the LCID and Brownstein’s ETHN 
programs.  
vii. Brownstein’s E-Tech Licensing Agreements (2000-
2005) 
 These standard consumer licensing agreements state 
that E-Tech owns the copyrights to the E-Tech system as its 
exclusive property, which is accurate and undisputed.  
Brownstein signed five of these agreements with E-Tech 
customers between 2000 and 2005, which satisfies the statute 
of frauds and imputes him with knowledge of their language.  
The distinguishing and critical fact is that the E-Tech system 
is a joint work formed from the combination of the LCID and 
CMR’s own system.  Therefore, by declaring that E-Tech 
owned the E-Tech system, the agreements were not asserting 
that E-Tech owned the copyrights to the LCID, which is a 
separately copyrightable component of the E-Tech system.  It 
is plausible that Brownstein might have been put on inquiry 
notice by these agreements but, viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to Brownstein, it is also plausible that 
these agreements would not have provided storm warnings of 
repudiation — after all, Brownstein would not have been 
concerned with, and has never claimed authorship of, the E-
Tech system. 
c. Questions Remaining for the Jury 
 Based on these potential sources of express 
repudiation, the District Court made its Rule 50(a) ruling 
when there were still genuinely disputed issues of material 
fact to be decided by the jury.  As mentioned, Lindsay’s 
registrations, standing alone, could not have repudiated 
Brownstein’s authorship as a matter of law. 
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 All the other potential sources of repudiation — the 
1996 argument with Raskin, the 1997 Software License, the 
1997 Agreement and 2000 Agreement, the 1998 Settlement 
Agreement, and the 2010 Settlement Agreement — involved 
factual determinations that should have been left for a jury.  
Accordingly, the issues of whether these six sources expressly 
repudiated Brownstein’s authorship were inappropriately 
decided under Rule 50(a) and should have gone to the jury. 
C. CANCELLATION OF BROWNSTEIN’S COPYRIGHT 
REGISTRATIONS 
 In granting summary judgment to Appellees on their 
counterclaim, the District Court ordered the cancellation of 
Brownstein’s 2009 copyright registrations.  The District 
Court was in error ab initio.  We hold that courts have no 
authority to cancel copyright registrations because there is no 
statutory indication whatsoever that courts have such 
authority.  Also, there is substantial indication that courts do 
not have such authority. 
 Like most courts, our Circuit has never had the chance 
to ascertain the role of courts in the cancellation of copyright 
registrations.  Of the few courts to do so, several have 
concluded that courts have no inherent or statutory authority 
to cancel copyright registrations.  See Xerox Corp. v. Apple 
Computer, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 1542, 1549 (N.D. Cal. 1990) 
(basing its decision on the Copyright Act, its legislative 
history, and Copyright Office regulations); Leegin Creative 
Leather Prods., Inc. v. M.M. Rogers & Co., No. 94-4644, 
1994 WL 761725, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 1994) (observing 
that the Copyright Act and Copyright Office regulations do 
not call for judicial cancellation of registrations); Syntek 
Semiconductor Co. v. Microchip Tech. Inc., 307 F.3d 775, 
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781-82 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that cancellation of a 
copyright registration is an administrative remedy that must 
be sought from the Copyright Office).  We agree. 
 Most decisively, there is no statutory authority in the 
Copyright Act that gives courts any general authority to 
cancel copyright registrations.  17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.; see 5 
William Patry, Patry on Copyright § 17:108.  In fact, there is 
evidence that the statute does not give courts any such 
authority.  Section 701, which describes the functions of the 
Copyright Office, explicitly states that “[a]ll administrative 
functions and duties under this title, except as otherwise 
specified, are the responsibility of the Register of 
Copyrights.”  17 U.S.C. § 701(a) (emphasis added).  
Cancellation of a copyright registration is certainly an 
administrative function, at least as much as issuing a 
registration is an administrative function.
14
  See Syntek 
Semiconductor Co., 307 F.3d at 781-82.   
                                                 
14
 Quizzically, Brownstein argues that the District Court had 
authority to cancel his registrations, but we disagree.  
Brownstein suggests that the requisites of § 411(b), which 
establish the criteria for obtaining a copyright registration, 
also implicitly provide the criteria for courts to cancel a 
registration.  17 U.S.C. § 411(b).  But a list of requirements is 
not a grant of authority.  Section 411(b) states that “the court 
shall request the Register of Copyrights to advise the court 
whether the inaccurate information, if known, would have 
caused the Register of Copyrights to refuse registration,” but 
it does not actually give courts authority to cancel a copyright 
registration.  Id.  If anything, this suggests that courts are not 
to adjudicate the grounds of cancellation because they are 
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 It is also telling that the Lanham Act explicitly 
provides courts with the general authority to cancel 
trademarks.  15 U.S.C. § 1119 (“In any action involving a 
registered mark the court may determine the right to 
registration, order the cancellation of registrations, in whole 
or in part, restore canceled registrations, and otherwise rectify 
the register with respect to the registrations of any party to the 
action.”).  If Congress had intended to grant courts the same 
general authority with respect to copyright registrations, it 
could have done so in equally express statutory language. 
 It bears noting that there is a provision in the 
Copyright Act that grants courts cancellation authority with 
respect to “original designs”.15  17 U.S.C. § 1324.  In carving 
                                                                                                             
limited to consulting the Register of Copyrights on such 
matters. 
 Brownstein also points to the cancellation regulation, 
37 C.F.R. § 201.7, as evidence that Congress intended for 
courts to cancel copyright registrations.  While § 201.7(b) 
clearly enumerates the requirements for cancellation of 
registration, § 201.7(a) also clearly delegates that authority to 
the Copyright Office.  37 C.F.R. § 201.7(a) (“Cancellation is 
an action taken by the Copyright Office . . . .”).  This only 
reaffirms that the authority to cancel copyright registrations 
resides with the Copyright Office. 
15
 Entitled “Power of court over registration”, this provision 
recites that “[i]n any action involving the protection of a 
design under this chapter, the court, when appropriate, may 
order registration of a design under this chapter or the 
cancellation of such a registration” — thus, it only applies to 
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out a specific power of cancellation, this provision only 
further suggests that courts have no general authority to 
cancel copyright registrations.  It is surely indicative that 
there is no such general cancellation provision in the 
Copyright Act.  Where Congress has used language in one 
provision but excluded it from another, we must generally 
ascribe meaning to the exclusion.  Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal 
Co., 534 U.S. 438, 452-53 (2002); Russello v. United States, 
464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).  Moreover, § 1324 would be 
superfluous if Congress intended for courts to already have 
the general authority to cancel copyright registrations.   
 This does not mean that courts have no place in the 
cancellation process and that aggrieved parties are without 
recourse to the courts when faced with faulty registrations.  
While courts may not directly cancel copyright registrations, 
courts have an oversight role in the administrative functions 
of the Copyright Office.  All actions of the Copyright Office 
are subject to the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and 
the judicial review attendant to the APA.  17 U.S.C. § 701(e) 
(“Except as provided by section 706 (b) and the regulations 
issued thereunder, all actions taken by the Register of 
Copyrights under this title are subject to the provisions of the 
Administrative Procedure Act . . . .”).  Thus, aggrieved parties 
may challenge an unfavorable decision by the Copyright 
Office in a cancellation matter by challenging its decision in 
court under the APA. 
 It also goes without saying that courts are authorized to 
police copyright registrations through authorship claims and 
                                                                                                             
designs and only to that chapter of the Copyright Act.  17 
U.S.C. § 1324. 
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infringement claims.  As emphasized earlier, a registration 
does not secure or create a copyright, as a right, or guarantee 
success on the merits of a claim — it entitles an author to 
bring an action under the Copyright Act and serves as proof 
of authorship of the copyrighted work. 
 Finally, we are in no way holding that courts are 
incapable of invalidating underlying copyrights.  While the 
two concepts are undoubtedly related,
16
 the distinction 
matters.  Holding that federal courts have the authority to 
cancel registrations would essentially be declaring that the 
judicial branch has the authority to order a legislative branch 
agency that is not a party to the litigation to take an 
affirmative action.  A federal court’s finding that a copyright 
is invalid, on the other hand, is a determination of ownership 
which does not disturb the registration of a copyright.  Courts 
have no authority to cancel copyright registrations because 
that authority resides exclusively with the Copyright Office. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s Rule 50(a) grant of judgment as a matter of law on 
                                                 
16
 Validity of a copyright denotes ownership — a necessary 
element to bring a copyright infringement action.  See 
Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 
663, 667 (3d Cir. 1990) (“‘The elements of a copyright 
infringement action are (1) ownership of a valid copyright 
and (2) copying by the alleged infringer.’”) (internal citations 
omitted).  Registration of a copyright, on the other hand, is 
merely “‘prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright 
. . . .’”  Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 410(c)).     
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Brownstein’s joint authorship claim and remand for a new 
trial.  We will also reverse the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment on Appellees’ counterclaim to cancel 
Brownstein’s copyright registrations. 
